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ABSTRACT
With the recent advances in voice synthesis such as WaveNet, AI-
synthesized fake voices are indistinguishable to human ears and
widely applied for producing realistic and natural DeepFakes which
are real threats to everyone. However, effective and robust detectors
for synthesized fake voices are still in their infancy and are not
ready to fully tackle this emerging threat. In this paper, we devise a
novel approach, named DeepSonar, based on monitoring neuron be-
haviors of speaker recognition (SR) system, a deep neural network
(DNN), to discern AI-synthesized fake voices. Layer-wise neuron be-
haviors provide an important insight to hunt the differences among
inputs, which are widely employed for building safety, robust and
interpretable DNNs. In this work, we leverage the power of layer-
wise neuron activation patterns with a conjecture that they can
capture the subtle differences between real and AI-synthesized fake
voices and provide a cleaner signal to classifiers than raw inputs.
Experiments are conducted in three datasets (including commercial
products from Google, Baidu, etc.) containing both English and
Chinese languages to corroborate the high detection rates (98.1%
average accuracy) and low false alarm rates (0.02 equal error rate)
of DeepSonar in discerning fake voices. Furthermore, extensive
experiment results show its robustness against manipulation at-
tacks (e.g., voice conversion and additive real-world noises). Our
work also poses a new insight into adopting neuron behaviors for
effective and robust AI aided multimedia fakes forensics instead of
motivated by various artifacts introduced in fakes.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy; • Information systems→Multimedia in-
formation systems; • Computing methodologies→ Artificial
intelligence.
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DeepFake, fake voice, neuron behavior
1 INTRODUCTION
In the August 2019, the wall street journal reported a new titled
"Fraudsters Used AI to Mimic CEO’s Voice in Unusual Cybercrime
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Figure 1: Two types of fake voices, voice cloning and text-to-speech. Voice
cloning is more likely a voice style transfer by giving a "source voice" and
output a cloned style similar "synthesized voice". Text-to-speech can generate
a new voices by any given texts having specific timbre. Degradation indicates
our proposed approach DeepSonar can handle voices that aremanipulated by
voice conversions and additive real-world noises.
Case"1. In this report, criminals used AI-based software to imper-
sonate a CEO’s voice and successfully swindled more than $243,000
by speaking on the phone in March, 2019. Recently, advances in
AI-synthesized techniques have shown its powerful capabilities in
creating highly sounded realistic voices [11, 42], indistinguishable
images [12, 15, 50], and natural videos [3, 13, 43]. Human eyes and
ears could be easily fooled by these realistic DeepFakes [35, 36]. Fur-
thermore, producing DeepFakes is easy with free tools like FaceApp,
ZAO, etc. Thus, it also raises security and privacy concerns to ev-
eryone while we are enjoying the fun of these synthesized fakes.
Powerful defense mechanisms should be developed by the com-
munity for fighting against DeepFakes and protecting us [28, 48].
Voice/speech synthesis steps into a new era since DeepMind
developed WaveNet [9, 38] which could generate realistic and con-
vincing voices. Improving the interaction experiences between
machines and humans is the initial idea for developing voice syn-
thesis techniques. Based on this idea, some commercial products
1https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraudsters-use-ai-to-mimic-ceos-voice-in-unusual-
cybercrime-case-11567157402
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like intelligent customer service are created by using voice syn-
thesis techniques. Unfortunately, some criminals misuse them for
illegal purposes like a politician gives an unreal statement which
may cause a regional crisis or someone imitates the victim’s voice
for fraud intentions. All of these can be easily performed without
any efforts by merely giving texts and a clip of the victim’s real
voice using some open-sourced tools [16] or commercial products
such as Baidu text-to-speech (TTS) systems. Thus, discerning a clip
of voice is synthesized with AI or spoken by humans is extremely
important in the era when hearing is not believing anymore.
TTS synthesis, voice cloning (VC), and replay attack (RA) are
three different modalities for synthesizing fake voices [29]. TTS and
VC regenerate the content, thus they are more realistic than RA and
difficult for human ears to distinguish. Therefore, they are especially
worrisome and pose the greatest risks. Figure 1 shows a more
detailed description of the two fake voices. Recently, AI-synthesized
fake voices have already drawn attention from the community.
Google launched a challenge competition dedicated to spoofed
voice detection [47]. Farid et al. proposed the first bispectral analysis
method to distinguish real human voices and AI-synthesized voices
based on the observation of the bispectral artifacts in fake voices
[1]. However, existing works on discerning AI-synthesized fake
voices are all failed in fully tackling the aforementioned TTS and
VC fake voices and thoroughly evaluating their robustness against
manipulation attacks, which is extremely important for a detector
deployed in the wild. Here, manipulation attacks indicate voices are
added with real-world noises (e.g., rain, laughing) or converted by
manipulating their signals without altering its linguistic contents,
such as resampling, shifting pitch.
Voice synthesis and image synthesis are regularly combined
for producing audio-visual consistent video DeepFakes. Compared
to image synthesis, voice synthesis exhibits some differences and
brings new challenges to detection. Firstly, artifacts in fake voices
could be hardly sounded and provide sufficient clues for forensics,
which is vastly different from artifacts in fake images that are
easily noticed by eyes. Secondly, voice signals are one dimension
signals. It is not simple to introduce artifacts into the voice synthesis
procedure as in images that have three channels. Lastly, voices
recorded indoors or outdoors where noises are abundant, it is easy
for attackers to fool detectors by adding real-world noises in such
circumstances, thus robustness is essential for fake voice detectors.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named DeepSonar2
as presented in Figure 1, based on monitoring neuron behaviors of
a DNN-based SR system with a simple binary-classifier to discern
AI-synthesized fake voices. We conjecture that the layer-by-layer
neuron behaviors in DNNs could provide more subtle features and
cleaner signals to classifiers than raw voice inputs, which served as
an important asset for differentiating real human voices and fake
voices. In this work, we dedicated to the TTS and VC fake voices
since they are AI-synthesized with content regenerated and more
indistinguishable than RA to our ears. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work employing layer-wise neuron behaviors to
discern AI-synthesized voices and conducting a comprehensive
2Sonar is known as its powerful capabilities in sniffing and probing electronic devices
under water based on sound signals. We hope that our approach is a sonar in discerning
AI-synthesized fake voices.
evaluation on its robustness against two manipulation attacks, 1)
voice conversions, and 2) additive real-world noises.
To comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of
our approach in discerning AI-synthesized fake voices, our experi-
ments are conducted in three datasets including publicly dataset
where voices are synthesized with commercial products and self-
build dataset with available open-sourced tools. In experiments, we
aim to evaluate the effectiveness of DeepSonar in distinguishing
fake voices synthesized with different languages, synthetic tech-
niques, etc. and investigate the robustness of DeepSonar in tack-
ling two manipulation attacks (including voice conversion and
additive real-world noises). Experimental results have shown
that DeepSonar gives an average accuracy higher than 98.1% and
an equal error rate (EER) lower than 0.02 in the three datasets. Deep-
Sonar also outperforms prior work leveraging bispectral artifacts
to differentiate fake voices [1] in both effectiveness and robustness.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• New observation of layer-wise neuron behaviors for dis-
cerning fake voices. We observe that the layer-wise neuron
behaviors capture more subtle features that provide cleaner sig-
nals to classifiers than raw voice inputs for building effective
and robust fake detectors. Thus, we propose DeepSonar based on
this observation by monitoring neuron behaviors to reveal the
differences between real voices and AI-synthesized fake voices.
• Performing a comprehensive evaluation of the effective-
ness and robustness against manipulations attacks. Exper-
iments are conducted in three datasets where voices are synthe-
sized with various techniques, containing English and mandarin
Chinese languages are spoken by males and females with differ-
ent accents. Experimental results illustrated its effectiveness in
discerning fake voices and robustness against two manipulation
attacks, voice conversions and additive real-world noises.
• New insight for fighting againstAI aidedmultimedia fakes.
Instead of investigating the artifacts introduced by various syn-
thetic techniques, our approach presents a new insight by leverag-
ing the power of layer-wise neuron behaviors for differentiating
real and fake in a generic manner. Furthermore, it also shows the
potentials for building robust detectors and evasion manipulation
attacks, which is important to be deployed in the wild.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the related work. Section 3 presents our method on
discerning fake voices in detail. In Section 4, we introduce the
experimental settings (e.g., datasets, baselines, and evaluation met-
rics) and implementation details. We show the experimental results
and demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed
method in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper and
discusses the future research directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Voice Synthesis
Voice synthesis is divided into two categories: 1) non-DNN based
such as using Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Gaussian Mix-
ture Models (GMMs) to learn speech features and replicate them,
and 2) DNN based for synthesizing naturalness speech and even
on unseen words.
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Non-DNN based. The first technique is speech concatenation
that concatenates some pre-recorded speech segments to synthe-
size a new clip voice [55]. The other technique on format analysis
uses acoustic models without a human voice as input to generate
robotic-sounding speech [45]. Modeling the human vocal tract and
vocal biomechanics is another technique for synthesizing speech,
which is known as articulatory speech synthesis [22]. Some stud-
ies explore leveraging HMM to modulate speech proprietaries like
fundamental frequency and duration [57]. These techniques are
widely employed in the early years for synthesizing speech, but
they suffer naturalness issues, which could be easily sounded by
human ears.
DNN based. DNN-based speech synthesis techniques directly
map linguistic features to acoustic features by leveraging the power
of DNNs in representation. Various models (e.g., Boltzmann ma-
chines [20], deep belief network [14], mixed density networks [2],
Bidirectional LSTM [18]) are proposed based on DNNs for syn-
thesizing high quality and naturalness speech. Some synthesized
samples are available online [33].
WaveNet [38] developed by DeepMind in 2016 and Tacotron [51]
created by Google in 2017 are two milestones in speech synthe-
sis. The two models significantly promote the progress of speech
synthesis which enables large scale commercial applications for
building TTS and VC systems is possible. WaveNet is originated
from PixelCNN [49] or PixelRNN [39] and shown its powerful ca-
pabilities in modeling waveforms with a generative model which
is trained in a real audio dataset. Tacotron [51] is an end-to-end
speech synthesis model that can be trained on <text, audio> pairs
to avoid large human annotation efforts.
Due to the powerful capabilities of WaveNet and Tacotron, some
commercial products are developed based on them, such as Baidu
TTS [27], Microsoft Azure TTS [8], Amazon AWS Polly [5], and
Google Cloud TTS [7]. Unfortunately, some attackers maliciously
use speech synthesis techniques and develop fake voices for fraud
intentions, which brings potential security concerns to us.
2.2 Fake Voice Detection
In the past decades, some digital audio forensic studies are working
on detecting various forms of audio spoofing [56]. These approaches
examine metadata of audio files and investigate their actual bytes.
Douglas et al. [17] examined the eleven audio recordings from
three olympus recorders in the digital header data for audio au-
thentication. Malik et al. [58] proposed using acoustic environment
signature as an important feature for detecting audio forgery by
verifying the integrity of digital audio. These studies failed in ad-
dressing audio content that is synthesized.
The most similar work to us is [1] which is the first study dedi-
cated to AI-synthesized fake voices. In their work, they proposed a
bispectral analysis method for detecting AI-synthesized fake voices.
They observed that specific and unusual spectral correlation exhib-
ited in the fake voices synthesized with DNNs, which is called bis-
pectral artifacts. Thus, they explored to use higher-order polyspec-
tral features for discriminating fake voices. This work is also mo-
tivated by investigating artifacts introduced in fake voices like
some recent studies on detecting synthesized fake images [19, 54].
Artifact-based detectors will be invalid when the artifacts fixed with
some optimization methods or new synthetic techniques proposed.
In this paper, instead of investigating the artifacts in raw voices
introduced in synthesis, we explore a new way by monitoring
neurons behaviors of DNN-based SR systems with a simple binary-
classifier to distinguish real and fake voices. The layer-wise neuron
behaviors can capture more subtle features in differentiating real
and fake voices. Experimental results show that our approach out-
performs previous work by investigating bispectral artifacts [1] in
both effectiveness and robustness evaluations.
3 METHOD
In this section, we firstly introduce our basic insight by monitoring
neuron behaviors to discern AI-synthesized fake voices, and then
present the overview framework of our proposed DeepSonar, finally
detail how to capture the layer-wise neuron behaviors and detecting
fake voices with binary-classifier in the following subsections.
3.1 Insight
Monitoring neuron behaviors is an important technique for hunting
the differences among a set of inputs to DNNs and investigating the
internal behaviors of DNNs, which is widely employed in assuring
the quality of DNNs [23, 30, 40, 53], protecting the safety of DNNs
like fighting adversarial examples attack [24, 25], and providing
interpretation for DNNs [44], etc.
In assuring the quality of DNNs, both DeepXplore [40] and Deep-
Gauge [23] introduced neuron coverage as testing criteria to explore
the amount of DNN logic covered by given a set of inputs. Neuron
coverage is similar to code coverage in traditional software testing
and used to explore the vulnerabilities of DNNs which is susceptible
to adversarial examples [10]. In ensuring the safety of DNNs, NIC
[24] and MODE [25] exploited the critical neurons in DNNs for
detecting adversarial examples and fixing bugs that are buggy neu-
rons caused misclassification in DNNs. In providing interpretation
for DNNs, AMI [44] explored the correlation between important
neurons and human perceptible face attributes.
According to recent studies, neuron behaviors have demon-
strated their powerful capabilities in investigating the internal
behaviors of DNNs and revealing the minor differences among
inputs like adversarial examples and legitimate inputs. In this work,
we conjecture that layer-wise neuron behaviors could capture more
subtle features and produce cleaner signals to a classifier than raw
voice inputs in distinguishing the differences between inputs. Thus,
we propose DeepSonar by monitoring layer-wise neuron behav-
iors of the DNN-based SR system with a simple binary-classifier to
discern human speeches and AI-synthesized fake voices.
3.2 Overview of DeepSonar Framework
We present the overview of DeepSonar framework in Figure 2. Gen-
erally, we first collect numerous real and synthesized fake voices
with good diversity in languages, accents, genders, and synthetic
techniques. Real voices are collected from public datasets and avail-
able free videos from the internet which are spoken by humans
in different languages, accents by males or females. In fake voice
collection, 1) use TTS techniques to synthesize new voices with
merely given texts, 2) utilize VC techniques to produce a clip of fake
, ,
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Figure 2: The framework of our proposed DeepSonar. We collect numerous real human speeches and fake voices synthesized with VC and TTS techniques as
inputs, then a DNN-based SR system is adopted to capture the raw layer-wise neuron behaviors of inputs and the designed neuron coverage criteria (e.g., ACN
and TKAN) is employed to determine the activate neurons which are more valuable in hunting the subtle differences between inputs, finally a binary-classifier is
trained based on the activated layer-wise behaviors of inputs to predict a clip of voice is real or fake.
voices having similar timbre to real voices. Then, we adopt a DNN-
based SR system to capture the layer-wise neuron behaviors for
both real and fake voices and determine the activated neurons with
designed neuron coverage criteria. Finally, the captured neuron
behaviors are formed as input feature vectors for training a simple
supervised binary-classifier based on shallow neural networks to
predict whether a clip of voice is a human speech or synthesized.
3.3 Layer-wise Neuron Behaviors
Layer and neuron are the basic components in a DNN model. Each
layer in DNNs has its own distinct merits in learning the input
representations [26]. A neuron x is the basic unit for representing
the inputs in each layer and calculated by activation function φ, pre-
vious layer neurons X ′ , weights matrixW , and bias b. Specifically,
the output value of neuron x is calculated as φ(W · X ′ + b).
Neurons can be classified as activated neurons and inactivated
neurons by given an input according to recent studies in DNN
testing [40]. Here, an activate neuron means that its output value
is large than a predefined threshold δ , and vice versa. According
to recent studies, activated neurons carry more information than
inactivate neurons and have a large influence on the following
consecutive layers [23, 40]. Thus, we monitor the activated neurons
to discern the differences among inputs.
In monitoring the layer-wise neuron behaviors, we need to ad-
dress the following three issues. Firstly, which DNN-based model
is more suitable for monitoring neuron behaviors? Secondly, which
layers in the model are elected to monitor neuron behaviors? Lastly,
how to determine the threshold δ using neuron coverage criteria?
Model selection.We monitor the layer-wise neuron behaviors
of a third-party DNN-based SR system, since generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs) for voice synthesis are infeasible. Speaker
recognition systems aim at determining the identity of speakers
by learning the acoustic features mostly with DNN-based models.
In this work, we exploit the DNN-based SR system to serve as a
third-party model for capturing the layer-wise neuron behaviors by
leveraging its power in representing speech in a layer-wise manner.
Layer selection.We select the layers which learn and preserve
valuable representation information of inputs, such as convolu-
tional and fully-connected layers in typical convolutional neural
networks (CNNs). Other layers like pooling without learning sub-
stantial representation information are redundant layers in our
work. It might be interesting to explore layers that specifically
learn the differences between real and fake voices in future work.
Neuron coverage criteria.We introduce two different neuron
coverage criteria to figure out the threshold δ for determining
activated neurons. Then, the determined activated neurons in each
selected layer are applied to represent the layer-wise behaviors of
voices. Previous work [40] uses a global threshold to determine the
neuron is activated or not, which is too coarse [23]. Here, we specify
each layer a particular threshold. More details on calculating the
threshold δ are presented in the following subsection.
3.4 Neuron Coverage Criteria Designing
In this paper, we introduce two different neuron coverage criteria
for determining activated neurons to capture layer-wise neuron
behaviors. The first one counts the number of activated neurons
in each layer, called average count neuron (ACN). The other one
selects neurons having top k values in each layer, named Top-k
activated neuron (TKAN).
ACN.Motivated by the weakness of the global threshold defined
in previous DNN testing studies, we specify each layer l with a
particular threshold δl which is calculated from the training dataset.
The threshold δl is an average value of all the neuron output value
in the layer l of all inputs in the training dataset. We calculate the
threshold δl with the following formula:
δl =
∑
x ∈X ,i ∈I φ(x , i;θ )
|I | · |X | (1)
where x is the neuron in lth layer, X is the set of neurons in layer l ,
i is the input in the training dataset I , φ is the activation function
for calculating the neuron output value of input i with trained
parameter θ , |X | and |I | represent the number of neurons in layer l
and the number of inputs in training dataset I , respectively. Here,
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Figure 3: Visualization of three different features in representing real and
fake voices. From the left to right, features are represented by MFCC, raw
layer-wise neuron behaviors, and activated neuron behaviors with designed
neuron coverage criteria, respectively. Here, we select the neuron coverage
criteria TKAN as an presentation example.
we define the ACN as follows:
ACN(l , i) = |{x |∀x ∈ l ,φ(x , i;θ ) > δl }| (2)
where i represents the input, x is the neuron in layer l , φ is an
activation function for computing the neuron output value, and δl
is the threshold of the l-th layer calculated by formula (1).
TKAN. Instead of learning a threshold from training datasets
to determine whether a neuron is activated or not, we explore an-
other neuron coverage criteria by simply selecting neurons whose
output value is ranked as top k in its layer. Here, we conjecture that
neurons with large output value are critical neurons which have
high influences in representing inputs for a DNN model. We define
the TKAN as follows:
TKAN(l , i) = {argmax
k
(φ(x , i;θ ),k) : x ∈ X } (3)
where the function argmax returns k neuron output value calcu-
lated with φ. Here, the k is applied for all the layers in the model.
Figure 3 adopts t-distributed stochastic neighbor embedding
(T-SNE), an algorithm for high-dimensional data visualization, to
visualize the effectiveness of neuron behaviors in hunting the dif-
ferences between real and fake voices compared with Mel-scale
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC), a popular feature in speech
analysis. From L-R, voices are represented with MFCC, raw layer-
wise neuron behaviors, and activated neurons with designed neuron
coverage criteria, respectively. We can easily find that compared
with MFCC, raw layer-wise neurons can capture the differences
between real and fake in a coarse manners, where the voices are
separated into several relatively independent clusters. Furthermore,
the subtle differences between real and fake voices can be easily
distinguished by applying our designed neuron coverage criteria,
where real and fake are separated into two independent clusters.
3.5 Fake Voices Detection
We train binary-classifier with a shallow neural network to predict
whether a clip of voice is human speech or AI-synthesized fake
voice. The inputs of our binary-classifier are the vectorized cap-
tured layer-wise neuron behaviors rather than the raw input of
voices, which is better for a simple classifier to learn the differences
between real and fake voices. Additionally, the neuron behavior
inputs are insensitive to manipulations on voices, thus they are
robust against various manipulations, such as voice conversion and
additive real-world noises.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for discerning fake voices with two
different layer-wise neuron behaviors.
Input :Training and testing dataset of fake and real voices I and D,
DNN-based SR model M˜ , top value k
Output :Label f laд
1 ▷ Select layers from M˜ to monitor neuron behaviors.
2 L ← LayerSelect ion(M˜ )
3 ▷ Capture layer-wise neuron behaviors with ACN.
4 Xl is a set of neurons in layer l of M˜ .
5 Vl counts activated neurons in layer l of M˜ .
6 for i ∈ I do
7 Sl =
∑
φ(Xl , i ; θ )
8 δl = 1|I | · S
9 for l ∈ L, i ∈ I, x ∈ X do
10 if φ(x, i ; θ ) > δl then
11 Vl = Vl + 1
12 ▷ Capture layer-wise neuron behaviors with TKAN.
13 Nl saves activated neuron output value in layer l of M˜ .
14 for i ∈ I do
15 Nl = argmaxk (φ(Xl , i ; θ ), k )
16 ▷ Train two independent binary-classifiers C˜acn , C˜tkan for ACN
17 and TKAN with input vector V and N to discern fake voices.
18 C˜acn ← Classif ierT raininд(V )
19 C˜tkan ← Classif ierT raininд(N )
20 ▷ Predict whether a clip of voice in D is real or fake.
21 for d ∈ D do
22 f laд ← argmax C˜acn (d ), C˜tkan (d )
23 return f laд
Algorithm 1 describes our basic ideas for capturing layer-wise
neurons behaviors for discerning real and fake voices. We train two
supervised binary-classifiers with the same architecture based on
the two different strategies, namely ACN and TKAN. In predicting
an input, we first obtain the layer-wise neuron behaviors with ACN
and TKAN, respectively. Then, the neuron behaviors are formed as
input features into the binary-classifier for prediction. For ACN, the
number of activated neurons in each layer is formed as a feature
vector. For TKAN, the raw value of neuron output which ranked
top k in its layer is formed as a feature vector. Finally, the classifier
predict the voice based on the classifier’s final output score.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING AND
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we introduce the basic experimental settings, includ-
ing datasets adopted for evaluation, baseline for comparison with
prior work, and evaluation metrics. Additionally, we also present
the implementation details.
4.1 Dataset
In our experiments, fake voices are collected from three differ-
ent datasets including TTS and VC synthesized with various tech-
niques. To ensure its diversity in languages and genders, English
and mandarin Chinese languages are spoken by males and females
, ,
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Table 1: Statistics of the three datasets for evaluating the effectiveness and
robustness of DeepSonar. Column Language indicates the language spoken
in the voice samples. Column Real Voice Collectionmeans the sources of real
voices collected in the dataset. All the real and fake voices in FoR are collected
from the second version for-norm in the original datasetwhere three different
versions are included. ColumnModel represents the number of techniques for
synthesizing voices. Last two columns Real(#) and Fake(#) denote the number
of real and fake voices in each dataset.
Dataset Type Language Real Voice Collection Model Real(#) Fake(#)
FoR TTS English multi-sources 7 26,941 26,927
MC-TTS TTS Chinese lecture_tts [31] unknown 6,000 6,026
Sprocket-VC VC English VCC16&VCC18 1 3,132 3,456
with different accents are contained. The first dataset is a pub-
lic dataset, called FoR, created by APTLY lab [37] with the latest
open-sourced tools and commercial speech synthesis products (e.g.,
Amazon AWS Polly, Google Cloud TTS, and Microsoft Azure TTS).
The real voices in FoR are collected from open-sourced speech
datasets and free available videos on internet like TED talks and
YouTube videos, which covers a good variety of genders, speaker
ages, and accents, etc. All the fake voices are synthesized with latest
deep learning-based techniques, which own high qualities. Unlike
the public dataset released by Google [47] which adopts some out-
dated techniques for voice synthesis rather than state-of-the-art
(SOTA) commercial products trained with massive powerful GPU
resources. However, the dataset FoR only contains the first type
TTS fake voices which are synthesized by given texts.
Therefore, we build the second dataset, a VC fake voice dataset.
The dataset is built by ourselves with an open-sourced tool sprocket
[16] which allows us to clone the source speaker’s identity into
the target speaker. Sprocket also served as a baseline system in
voice conversion challenge 2018 (VCC18) [21]. Here, real voices are
collected from voice conversion challenge 2016 (VCC16) [46] and
VCC18. The second dataset is called Sprocket-VC.
However, fake voices in the first and second datasets are all
spoken in English language, thus we build the third dataset where
fake voices are all spoken in mandarin Chinese for evaluating the
capabilities of our approach in tackling different languages. We
adopt the Baidu speech synthesis system [6] which achieves the
best performance in Chinese language synthesis. We give a series
of ancient poetry [32] as input texts to produce numerous fake
voices. The third dataset is called MC-TTS. More details of the
three datasets are shown in Table 1. We also present the length
distribution of voices in the three datasets in Figure 4.
4.2 Baseline
In evaluation, we mainly compared our work with a prior work
leveraging bispectral artifacts on fake voices to differentiate hu-
man speech and AI-synthesized fake voices [1]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is a SOTA work focused on AI-synthesized fake
voices detection. We implemented this work with open-sourced
available repositories in GitHub [4]. The details of the baseline are
introduced in Section 5.1.
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Figure 4: Real and fake voices length distribution in the three datasets. Y-axis
indicates the ratio of voices that lies in the length range with an offset ±1.
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
To get a comprehensive evaluation of DeepSonar, we adopt seven
different metrics to evaluate the capabilities of DeepSonar in fight-
ing against TTS and VC in the three datasets.
Specifically, we use accuracy, AUC (area under curve) of ROC
(receiver operating characteristics), F1-score, and AP (average pre-
cision) to evaluate whether DeepSonar achieves a higher detection
rate. We use FPR (false positive rate), FNR (false negative rate), and
EER (equal error rate) to get the false alarm rate of DeepSonar in
prediction. These seven metrics are widely served as metrics in
evaluating the performance of classifiers.
4.4 Implementation Details
Wedesign a shallow neural networkwithmerely five fully-connected
layers as our binary-classifier for discerning fakes. The optimizer
is SGD with momentum 0.9 and the starting learning rate is 0.0001,
with a decay of 1e-6. The loss function is binary cross-entropy.
In monitoring neuron behaviors, we employ a speaker recog-
nition deep network that adopts a ‘thin-ResNet’ as its backend
architecture [52] and select the convolutional and fully-connected
layers to capture the layer-wise neuron behaviors as input features.
Our approach is generic to any speech representation system, which
could be easily extended to other systems that have the capability
to learn speech representations layer-by-layer. For TKAN, we em-
pirically set k to 5 with a consideration of the number of selected
layers and training samples.
In evaluating the robustness of DeepSonar against manipulation
attacks, we select more than 15 different manipulations to get a
comprehensive evaluation. We hope that these 15 different rep-
resentative voice manipulations could be served as a robustness
evaluation benchmark for future research. Table 2 shows us the 15
different manipulations which are classified as voice conversions
by changing voice signals and real-world noises by adding envi-
ronmental noises. The real-world noise samples are collected from
a public dataset ESC-50 that includes lots of environmental audio
recordings [41].
All our experiments are conducted on a server running Ubuntu
16.04 system on a total of 40 cores 2.20GHz Xeon CPUs with 500GB
RAM and four NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPUs with 36GB memory for
each.
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Table 2: Voice conversions and additive real-world noises in manipulation at-
tacks. Voice conversion includes three common transformations when pub-
lishing audios. Additive real-world noises are classified into indoor and out-
door environmental sounds. The selected 12 real-world noises from ESC-50
are representative environmental sounds in real scenarios.
Manipulation Attacks Sound Classes
Voice Conversions 1) resampling, 2) speed, 3) pitch
Real-world Noises
Indoors 1) breathing, 2) footsteps, 3) laughing4) mouse-click, 5) keyboard-type, 6) clock-tick
Outdoors 1) engine, 2) train, 3) fireworks4) rain, 5) wind, 6) thunderstorm
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct experiments in three datasets to com-
prehensively evaluate the effectiveness of DeepSonar in discerning
AI-synthesized fake voices and its robustness against two typical
manipulation attacks, voice conversions and additive real-world
noises. Thus, our evaluation aims to answer the following two
research questions.
• RQ1: What is the performance of DeepSonar in discerning two
types of fake voices (TTS and VC) synthesized with various
techniques and tackling different languages?
• RQ2: Whether DeepSonar is robust against voice manipula-
tion attacks including voice conversions and additive real-world
noises at various magnitudes?
5.1 Detection Results (RQ1)
In this section, wemainly answer the first research question, whether
our approach DeepSonar can effectively discern real and fake voices
and tackle different languages. Our experiments are conducted in
the three different datasets in Table 1. Each dataset is divided into
three parts, e.g., 60%, 20%, 20% as training, validation and testing,
respectively. Specifically, we also compared our work with prior
work using bispectral artifacts served as a baseline and report the
detection rate and false alarm rate using seven different metrics.
Effectiveness of DeepSonar. Table 3 shows us the experimen-
tal results of DeepSonar using two different neuron coverage criteria
for determining activated neurons. DeepSonar gives an average
accuracy more than 98.1% and EER lower than 0.02 in the three
datasets and demonstrates the effectiveness in discerning the two
typical fake voices in both English and Chinese languages. In the
first dataset FoR where voices are synthesized with commercial
products and more challenging than the other two datasets, Deep-
Sonar gives an accuracy more than 99% when employing TKAN,
but it reaches an accuracy less than 90% when adopting ACN. This
result illustrates that using TKAN is more powerful than ACN in
tackling voices synthesized with various commercial-level synthetic
techniques. Thus, we mainly compare our approach using TKAN
with baseline.
Compared with baseline. Table 4 gives the compared results
with the baseline. Both the baseline and our proposed DeepSonar
are trained and tested on the same datasets. Experimental results
show that the average performance of DeepSonar using TKAN
significantly outperforms the baseline in the three datasets. The
baseline is a SOTA work using bispectral artifacts in fake voices to
differentiate real and fake voices [1]. They found that higher-order
spectral correlations rarely exist in real human speech while they
Table 3: Performance of DeepSonar using two different neuron behaviors (e.g.,
ACN and TKAN) in discerning real and fake voices. The last row DeepSonar
represents an average results in the three datasets. ↑means the larger value
the better, while ↓ indicates the smaller value the better.
Datasets Methods Acc. ↑ AUC ↑ F1 ↑ AP ↑ FPR ↓ FNR ↓ EER ↓
FoR ACN 0.8927 0.8930 0.8939 0.8604 0.1193 0.0946 0.1164TKAN 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Sprocket-VC ACN 0.9989 0.9989 0.9989 0.9989 0.002 0.0 0.002TKAN 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MC-TTS ACN 0.9975 0.9975 0.9975 0.9975 0.005 0.0 0.005TKAN 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DeepSonar 0.981 0.982 0.982 0.976 0.021 0.016 0.021
Table 4: Performance of DeepSonar and the baseline using bispectral artifacts
based from Farid et al. [1], in three datasets in discerning AI-synthesized fake
voices. DeepSonar utilizes TKAN tomonitor neuron behaviors. Average result
denotes an average performance of the three approaches in the three different
datasetsmeasured by sevenmetrics. ↑means the larger value the better, while
↓ indicates the smaller value the better.
Datasets Methods Acc. ↑ AUC ↑ F1 ↑ AP ↑ FPR ↓ FNR ↓ EER ↓
FoR Farid et al. [1] 0.713 0.746 0.757 0.821 0.345 0.163 0.292DeepSonar 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998 0.9997 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Sprocket
VC
Farid et al. [1] 0.652 0.658 0.681 0.687 0.371 0.314 0.351
DeepSonar 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MC-TTS Farid et al. [1] 0.626 0.693 0.711 0.869 0.421 0.193 0.343DeepSonar 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average
Result
Farid et al. [1] 0.664 0.699 0.716 0.792 0.379 0.223 0.329
DeepSonar 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
are common in AI-synthesized fake voices. In their experiments,
a simple classifier with SVM is adopted to identify the bispectral
artifacts for differentiating real and fake voices. Different from
this work investigating the artifacts introduced in synthesis, we
leverage the power of layer-wise neuron behaviors for representing
inputs, which provides cleaner signals than raw voice inputs (e.g.,
bispectral artifacts in voices) to simple binary-classifier in hunting
the differences between real and fake voices.
According to the experimental results in Table 3 and Table 4,
detecting clean AI-synthesized fake voices is a relatively easy task
for our proposed approach DeepSonar. Unfortunately, voice ma-
nipulations like voices resampling, adding real-world noises are
common in real applications, thus evading manipulation attacks is
important for detectors deployed in the wild. In the next subsec-
tion, we mainly discuss the robustness of our approach in tackling
manipulation attacks at various magnitudes.
5.2 Evaluation on Robustness (RQ2)
The biggest difference between AI-synthesized fake images and fake
voices lies in that manipulations like voice conversion and additive
real-world noises can be easily camouflaged as regular operations.
In this section, we mainly evaluate the robustness of DeepSonar in
tackling voice conversion and additive real-world noises at various
magnitudes to answer the second research question.
Experimental settings. In experiments, we select 1, 000 sam-
ples including 500 real and 500 fake voices from the testing dataset
in FoR since they are synthesized with commercial products and
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Figure 5: Signals of voices manipulated by voice conversion and additive real-
world noises. In voice conversions, voice upsampling by adding 400, speed ra-
tio set to 0.8 times, pitch-shifted by 4 steps. In additive real-world noises, we
present voice signals by adding four real-world noises including indoors (foot-
steps) and outdoors (fireworks, train, wind, thunderstorm) noises (SNR=35).
The original clip of synthesized fake voice is from the FoR dataset saying "Do
you feel like eating something".
more challenging for detection. We also employ TKAN for Deep-
Sonar and compare it with the baseline like in effectiveness eval-
uation experiment. AUC is adopted for evaluation metrics as it is
often used in the binary-classifier performance evaluation. Addi-
tionally, we use signal to noise ratio (SNR) as metrics to evaluate
the magnitude of real-world noises. The SNR is defined as follows.
SNR = 20 log
(RMS2signal
RMS2noise
)
(4)
where loд is the logarithm of 10 and root mean square (RMS) is the
root mean square.
By adding noises to voice data, we first need to obtain the RMS
of the noises and voices, respectively. Then, we modify the noise
by multiplying each element with a constant to change the RMS,
thus desired SNR is given. In voice conversion, various voice ma-
nipulations are implemented with the APIs provided by libsora
[34]. Figure 5 presents a spectral centroid visualization of the two
manipulation attacks, the left is voice conversion and the right is
additive real-world noises. The two manipulations all have obvious
modifications to the signals, which poses challenges to detectors.
Results on voice conversions. Figure 6(a) presents us the ex-
perimental results of DeepSonar in tackling three typical voice
conversions. Experimental results show that DeepSonar is robust
against resampling including upsampling and downsampling with-
out any performance affected. The average performance is de-
creased less than 5% and 15% in stretching the voices and shift-
ing pitches, respectively. Compared to the other two conversions
(resampling and speed), DeepSonar is a little susceptible to pitch
shifting. The main reason is that voices with pitch shifting have
been broken and can hardly listen to the words in voices when
the n_steps for changing the pitch of voices is larger than 2. The
settings for the three voice conversions are presented as follows.
In voice conversion, resampling indicates a time series of voice
which is resampled from the original sample rate to the target
sample rate, including upsampling and downsampling. Here, the
target sample rate is set with an offset (e.g., −400, 200, 0, 200, 400) to
the original sample rate, where offset 0 servers as a baseline without
resampling. Speed represents time-stretch an audio series by a fixed
rate. The fixed-rate is set to 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, where 1.0 serves as
a baseline. Pitch means we shift the pitch of a waveform by n_steps
semitones, Here, the n_step is set to −4,−2, 0, 2, 4, where n_step 0
serves as a baseline that no pitch is shifted.
Results on indoor-noises. In additive real-world noises, voices
are added with representative indoors and outdoors environmental
noises. We use SNR to measure the magnitudes of added-noises.
In Figure 6(b), DeepSonar performs well on the five indoor noises
and the average performance decreased less than 10% at the total
five different magnitudes. However, the average performance is
decreased by nearly 20% at the five magnitudes when adding foot-
step noises. We listened to the added-footstep voices which have
obviously mixed sizzle noises caused by the friction with floors.
Figure 5 also visualizes the differences between original voices and
added-footsteps voices.
Results on outdoor-noises. In Figure 6(c), outdoor environ-
mental noises can be classified into three different categories based
on the performance of DeepSonar. Engine and thunderstorm en-
vironmental noises are the first categories, where the average per-
formance of DeepSonar decreased less than 7% at the five different
magnitudes. Fireworks and train are the second categories, where
the average performance of DeepSonar decreased less than 18% at
the five different magnitudes.Wind and rain are the third categories,
where the average performance of DeepSonar decreased by nearly
25% at the five different magnitudes. We find that environmental
noises wind and rain also mixed with other voices like rain drops
on the ground which is noisy than other types of real-world noises.
According to the experimental results in Figure 6, DeepSonar is
also robust against voice conversions except voices are seriously
damaged like shifting pitch with a big step. Additionally, Deep-
Sonar performs well when the additive real-world noises are single
voice without any mixture with other types of noises. In tackling
mixed noises like wind, DeepSonar also holds a high detection
performance at the magnitude measured by SNR larger than 35.
Compared with baseline. The dotted lines in the three subfig-
ures of Figure 6 show the comparison results with the baseline by
using bispectral artifacts to discern fake voices. To compare the
performance of robustness with baseline, we use the average results
of the two approaches over different types of voice manipulations
at various magnitudes. For example, in Figure 6(b), each point in the
dotted line is an average AUC score of the six additive indoor noises
at the same magnitude. In Figure 6, the dotted line of DeepSonar is
above the baseline, which indicates that DeepSonar significantly
outperforms the baseline in all the two manipulation attacks.
5.3 Discussion
Our proposed DeepSonar achieves competitive results on both effec-
tiveness and robustness against twomanipulation attacks. However,
DeepSonar also has some limitations. Firstly, in adversarial envi-
ronments, adversaries could add an additional loss function by
modeling the neuron behaviors to generate adversarial voices and
evade detection. However, almost all the learning-based approaches
suffer this adversarial noise attack and an obvious trade-off between
generating adversarial voices and evading detection has existed.
Secondly, real-world noises with a mixture of other types of noises
at a high magnitude could decrease the performance of DeepSonar
to some extent. Voice denoising will be a potential strategy for high-
intensity mixed noises, which could be our future work to remove
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Figure 6: Robustness evaluation of DeepSonar against manipulation attacks at various magnitudes. In voice conversions (a), values in x-axis for resampling are
{-400, -200, 0, 200, 400}, for speed are {0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4}, for pitch are {-4, -2, 0, 2, 4}. The dotted lines in the three subfigures represent an average performance of
our approach DeepSonar and the baseline over different voice manipulations at various magnitudes. Large SNRmeans less noises added.
additional environmental noises. Especially, the voice denoising
component is effective without obtaining any prior knowledge of
the noises in the complex environments.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach, named DeepSonar,
by monitoring neuron behaviors instead of investigating various
artifacts introduced in voice synthesis to discern AI-synthesized
fake voices with a simple binary-classifier. Experiments in the three
datasets illustrate the effectiveness of our approach and evaluation
on the two manipulation attacks demonstrates its robustness in
tackling different voice conversions and additive real-world noises,
which shows the potentials to be deployed in the wild. Furthermore,
our work presents a new insight for detecting AI aided multimedia
fakes by monitoring neuron behaviors, which aims to build an
effective and robust detector.
In fighting against AI-synthesized voices, robustness should be
considered as a priority in designing a detector, since various manip-
ulations on voices can be easily camouflaged as regular operations,
while manipulation on images is limited and easy to be spotted. Fur-
thermore, the inconsistency of audio and visual in video DeepFakes
is an important clue for DeepFake forensics, thus how to combine
recent advances in fake still image and fake voice detection to spot
the inconsistency is an important topic for future research. Our neu-
ron behaviors based technique may be a promising idea. Producing
and fighting fakes in the AI era is like a mouse and cat game. More
powerful weapons should be continuously developed for fighting
AI aided fakes as new techniques for producing various fakes will
emerge inadvertently.
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